Service-to-Service Communication

Overview

SGIVU microservices support two authentication mechanisms:

JWT Tokens (from gateway/users) - Standard OAuth2 Bearer authentication
Internal Service Keys (service-to-service) - Shared secret for internal calls

This document covers the internal service authentication pattern using the X-Internal-Service-Key header.

Internal service keys are used for server-to-server communication within the private network. They bypass OAuth2 flows for performance and simplicity when one microservice needs to call another.

Why Internal Service Keys?

Problems with JWT-Only Authentication

If all internal calls required user JWTs:

Chicken-and-egg problem: Auth service needs to call User service to validate credentials, but User service requires a JWT from Auth
Performance overhead: Obtaining service-level JWTs adds latency
Token expiration: Services need refresh token logic for long-running operations
Complexity: OAuth2 client credentials flow adds unnecessary complexity for internal calls

Internal Service Key Benefits

✅ Simple: Single shared secret per service
✅ Fast: No token exchange, just header validation
✅ Stateless: No token expiration to manage
✅ Network-isolated: Only accessible within private network
✅ Flexible: Works for background jobs, scheduled tasks, event handlers

Security Assumption: Internal service keys rely on network-level isolation. Services must NOT be exposed to the public internet. Use AWS VPC, Kubernetes network policies, or equivalent isolation.

Implementation

Architecture

Example: The sgivu-auth service calls sgivu-user to validate credentials during login:

POST /api/validate-credentials HTTP/1.1
Host: sgivu-user:8081
X-Internal-Service-Key: internal-secret-key-value
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "username": "john.doe",
  "password": "hashedPassword"
}

Filter Implementation

Each microservice implements an InternalServiceAuthenticationFilter that runs before the JWT authentication filter:

@Component
public class InternalServiceAuthenticationFilter extends OncePerRequestFilter {
  
  private static final String INTERNAL_KEY_HEADER = "X-Internal-Service-Key";
  
  private final String internalServiceKey;
  private final List<SimpleGrantedAuthority> internalAuthorities = List.of(
    new SimpleGrantedAuthority("car:read"),
    new SimpleGrantedAuthority("car:create"),
    new SimpleGrantedAuthority("car:update"),
    new SimpleGrantedAuthority("car:delete"),
    new SimpleGrantedAuthority("motorcycle:read"),
    new SimpleGrantedAuthority("motorcycle:create"),
    new SimpleGrantedAuthority("motorcycle:update"),
    new SimpleGrantedAuthority("motorcycle:delete"),
    new SimpleGrantedAuthority("vehicle:read"),
    new SimpleGrantedAuthority("vehicle:create"),
    new SimpleGrantedAuthority("vehicle:delete")
  );
  
  public InternalServiceAuthenticationFilter(
      @Value("${service.internal.secret-key}") String internalServiceKey) {
    this.internalServiceKey = internalServiceKey;
  }
  
  @Override
  protected void doFilterInternal(
      HttpServletRequest request, 
      HttpServletResponse response, 
      FilterChain filterChain) throws ServletException, IOException {
    
    if (shouldAuthenticate(request)) {
      UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken authentication =
        new UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken(
          "internal-service",  // Principal
          null,                // Credentials
          internalAuthorities  // Authorities
        );
      authentication.setDetails(
        new WebAuthenticationDetailsSource().buildDetails(request)
      );
      SecurityContextHolder.getContext().setAuthentication(authentication);
    }
    
    filterChain.doFilter(request, response);
  }
  
  private boolean shouldAuthenticate(HttpServletRequest request) {
    // Skip if already authenticated (JWT took precedence)
    if (SecurityContextHolder.getContext().getAuthentication() != null) {
      return false;
    }
    
    String providedKey = request.getHeader(INTERNAL_KEY_HEADER);
    return internalServiceKey.equals(providedKey);
  }
}

Key Points:

Checks for existing authentication: If JWT was already validated, skip internal key check
Constant-time comparison: Use equals() for timing-attack resistance (or MessageDigest.isEqual() for extra safety)
Fixed authorities: All internal calls get the same permissions (full CRUD)
Principal name: "internal-service" identifies internal calls in logs

Security Configuration

The filter is added before the JWT authentication filter:

@Configuration
@EnableWebSecurity
@EnableMethodSecurity
public class SecurityConfig {
  
  private final InternalServiceAuthenticationFilter internalServiceAuthenticationFilter;
  
  @Bean
  SecurityFilterChain securityFilterChain(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
    http
      .oauth2ResourceServer(oauth2 -> oauth2.jwt(...))
      .authorizeHttpRequests(authz -> authz
        .requestMatchers("/v1/cars/**", "/v1/motorcycles/**")
        .access(internalOrAuthenticatedAuthorizationManager())
        .anyRequest().authenticated()
      )
      .csrf(AbstractHttpConfigurer::disable)
      .addFilterBefore(
        internalServiceAuthenticationFilter, 
        BearerTokenAuthenticationFilter.class  // Run before JWT validation
      );
    
    return http.build();
  }
  
  @Bean
  AuthorizationManager<RequestAuthorizationContext> internalOrAuthenticatedAuthorizationManager() {
    AuthorizationManager<RequestAuthorizationContext> authenticatedManager =
      (authenticationSupplier, context) -> {
        Authentication authentication = authenticationSupplier.get();
        boolean isAuthenticated = authentication != null 
          && authentication.isAuthenticated() 
          && !(authentication instanceof AnonymousAuthenticationToken);
        return new AuthorizationDecision(isAuthenticated);
      };
    
    return AuthorizationManagers.anyOf(
      internalServiceAuthManager,  // Check internal key
      authenticatedManager         // OR check JWT
    );
  }
}

Authorization Logic:

anyOf: Request is allowed if either internal key is valid OR JWT is valid
Filter order: Internal filter runs first, JWT filter runs second
Short-circuit: If internal key matches, JWT validation is skipped

Authorization Manager

The InternalServiceAuthorizationManager checks if the current authentication is from an internal service:

@Component
public class InternalServiceAuthorizationManager 
    implements AuthorizationManager<RequestAuthorizationContext> {
  
  @Override
  public AuthorizationDecision check(
      Supplier<Authentication> authentication, 
      RequestAuthorizationContext context) {
    
    Authentication auth = authentication.get();
    
    if (auth == null || !auth.isAuthenticated()) {
      return new AuthorizationDecision(false);
    }
    
    // Check if principal is "internal-service"
    boolean isInternal = "internal-service".equals(auth.getName());
    return new AuthorizationDecision(isInternal);
  }
}

Configuration

Environment Variables

Each microservice:

# Shared secret for internal service authentication
SERVICE_INTERNAL_SECRET_KEY=your-strong-random-secret-here

All microservices must use the SAME secret key. If keys mismatch, internal calls will fail with 401/403.

Application YAML:

service:
  internal:
    secret-key: ${SERVICE_INTERNAL_SECRET_KEY}

Generating a Secure Key

Use a cryptographically secure random string:

# Generate 32-byte (256-bit) random key
openssl rand -base64 32

# Or use UUID (128-bit)
uuidgen

Example:

SERVICE_INTERNAL_SECRET_KEY=8x9Y2mP4kL7qR3nV5wT1bN6jH0sF8dG9

Use Cases

1. Auth Service → User Service (Credentials Validation)

Scenario: During login, sgivu-auth needs to validate user credentials. Call from Auth Service:

@Service
public class CredentialsValidationService {
  
  private final WebClient webClient;
  
  @Value("${service.internal.secret-key}")
  private String internalServiceKey;
  
  public Mono<CredentialsValidationResponse> validateCredentials(
      String username, String password) {
    
    return webClient.post()
      .uri(userServiceUrl + "/api/validate-credentials")
      .header("X-Internal-Service-Key", internalServiceKey)
      .bodyValue(new CredentialsValidationRequest(username, password))
      .retrieve()
      .bodyToMono(CredentialsValidationResponse.class);
  }
}

Endpoint in User Service:

@RestController
public class CredentialsValidationController {
  
  @PostMapping("/api/validate-credentials")
  public CredentialsValidationResponse validate(
      @RequestBody CredentialsValidationRequest request) {
    
    // This endpoint is protected by InternalServiceAuthenticationFilter
    User user = userRepository.findByUsername(request.username())
      .orElseThrow(() -> new UsernameNotFoundException("User not found"));
    
    boolean matches = passwordEncoder.matches(
      request.password(), 
      user.getPassword()
    );
    
    if (!matches) {
      throw new BadCredentialsException("Invalid password");
    }
    
    return new CredentialsValidationResponse(
      user.getId(),
      user.getUsername(),
      user.getRoles(),
      user.getPermissions()
    );
  }
}

2. Vehicle Service → User Service (Permission Check)

Scenario: Vehicle service needs to check if a user has permissions to perform an action.

@Service
public class VehicleService {
  
  @Value("${service.internal.secret-key}")
  private String internalServiceKey;
  
  public void deleteVehicle(Long vehicleId, Long userId) {
    // Check if user has delete permission
    UserPermissionsResponse permissions = webClient.get()
      .uri(userServiceUrl + "/api/users/" + userId + "/permissions")
      .header("X-Internal-Service-Key", internalServiceKey)
      .retrieve()
      .bodyToMono(UserPermissionsResponse.class)
      .block();
    
    if (!permissions.hasPermission("vehicle:delete")) {
      throw new AccessDeniedException("User lacks vehicle:delete permission");
    }
    
    vehicleRepository.deleteById(vehicleId);
  }
}

3. Background Jobs

Scenario: Scheduled task needs to call microservices without a user context.

@Scheduled(cron = "0 0 2 * * *")  // Daily at 2 AM
public void cleanupExpiredVehicles() {
  webClient.delete()
    .uri(vehicleServiceUrl + "/api/vehicles/expired")
    .header("X-Internal-Service-Key", internalServiceKey)
    .retrieve()
    .bodyToMono(Void.class)
    .block();
}

Security Considerations

Network Isolation

Critical: Internal endpoints MUST NOT be exposed to the public internet.

AWS Deployment:

┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Public Subnet (DMZ)                │
│  - ALB (HTTPS only)                 │
│  - Nginx (reverse proxy)            │
│    └──> Routes to Gateway only      │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
              │
              ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Private Subnet                     │
│  - sgivu-gateway (public routes)    │
│  - sgivu-auth (internal only)       │
│  - sgivu-user (internal only)       │
│  - sgivu-vehicle (internal only)    │
│    └──> All accessible via          │
│         X-Internal-Service-Key      │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘

Kubernetes NetworkPolicies:

apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: allow-internal-only
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: sgivu-user
  policyTypes:
  - Ingress
  ingress:
  - from:
    - podSelector:
        matchLabels:
          app: sgivu-auth
    - podSelector:
        matchLabels:
          app: sgivu-vehicle
    - podSelector:
        matchLabels:
          app: sgivu-gateway

Secret Management

Development:

# .env file (never commit)
SERVICE_INTERNAL_SECRET_KEY=dev-secret-key-12345

Production:

AWS Secrets Manager: Fetch secret on startup
HashiCorp Vault: Dynamic secrets with rotation
Kubernetes Secrets: Inject as environment variable

Example (AWS Secrets Manager):

@Configuration
public class SecretsConfig {
  
  @Bean
  public String internalServiceKey(SecretsManagerClient secretsClient) {
    GetSecretValueRequest request = GetSecretValueRequest.builder()
      .secretId("sgivu/internal-service-key")
      .build();
    
    GetSecretValueResponse response = secretsClient.getSecretValue(request);
    return response.secretString();
  }
}

Key Rotation

Zero-downtime rotation process:

Add new key: Update secret manager with NEW_SERVICE_INTERNAL_SECRET_KEY

Update services: Deploy services with dual-key support:

private boolean isValidKey(String providedKey) {
  return internalServiceKey.equals(providedKey) 
      || newInternalServiceKey.equals(providedKey);
}

Update callers: Deploy calling services with new key
Remove old key: After all services use new key, remove old key support

Rotation Frequency: Every 90 days (or when compromised)

Rate Limiting

Add rate limiting for internal endpoints to prevent abuse:

@Component
public class InternalServiceRateLimitFilter extends OncePerRequestFilter {
  
  private final RateLimiter rateLimiter = RateLimiter.create(100.0); // 100 req/sec
  
  @Override
  protected void doFilterInternal(...) {
    if ("internal-service".equals(authentication.getName())) {
      if (!rateLimiter.tryAcquire()) {
        response.setStatus(HttpStatus.TOO_MANY_REQUESTS.value());
        return;
      }
    }
    filterChain.doFilter(request, response);
  }
}

Logging and Monitoring

Log all internal service calls for audit:

private boolean shouldAuthenticate(HttpServletRequest request) {
  String providedKey = request.getHeader(INTERNAL_KEY_HEADER);
  boolean isValid = internalServiceKey.equals(providedKey);
  
  if (providedKey != null) {
    if (isValid) {
      log.info("Internal service authenticated [path={}, ip={}]",
        request.getRequestURI(),
        request.getRemoteAddr());
    } else {
      log.warn("Invalid internal service key [path={}, ip={}]",
        request.getRequestURI(),
        request.getRemoteAddr());
    }
  }
  
  return isValid;
}

CloudWatch/Prometheus Metrics:

internal_service_requests_total{service="sgivu-user",status="success"} 1523
internal_service_requests_total{service="sgivu-user",status="invalid_key"} 3

Comparison: Internal Key vs JWT

Aspect	Internal Service Key	JWT Bearer Token
Use Case	Service-to-service (internal)	User-to-service (external)
Network	Private network only	Can traverse public network
Expiration	No expiration (rotated manually)	30 minutes (auto-refresh)
Permissions	Fixed (all CRUD)	User-specific (claims)
Performance	Fast (simple string comparison)	Slower (crypto validation)
Audit	Service identity only	User + service identity
Revocation	Rotate key (impacts all services)	Revoke individual token

When to use each:

Internal Key: sgivu-auth → sgivu-user, background jobs, scheduled tasks
JWT: Gateway → microservices (user requests), external API calls

Alternative: Mutual TLS (mTLS)

For zero-trust architectures, consider replacing internal keys with mTLS: Benefits:

Cryptographic service identity (client certificates)
Network-layer security (TLS 1.3)
Automatic key rotation (certificate expiration)

Drawbacks:

Complex certificate management (CA, CRLs)
Higher operational overhead
Requires Kubernetes/Istio service mesh or manual cert distribution

When to use mTLS:

Multi-tenant environments
Compliance requirements (PCI-DSS, HIPAA)
Services in different VPCs/clusters

OAuth2 & OIDC - External authentication flows
JWT Tokens - User authentication with JWTs
BFF Pattern - How the gateway manages user sessions

Overview

Getting Started

Core Features

Infrastructure

Security

Service-to-Service Communication

Overview

Why Internal Service Keys?

Problems with JWT-Only Authentication

Internal Service Key Benefits

Implementation

Architecture

Filter Implementation

Security Configuration

Authorization Manager

Configuration

Environment Variables

Generating a Secure Key

Use Cases

1. Auth Service → User Service (Credentials Validation)

2. Vehicle Service → User Service (Permission Check)

3. Background Jobs

Security Considerations

Network Isolation

Secret Management

Key Rotation

Rate Limiting

Logging and Monitoring

Comparison: Internal Key vs JWT

Alternative: Mutual TLS (mTLS)

Overview

Getting Started

Core Features

Infrastructure

Security

​Overview

​Why Internal Service Keys?

​Problems with JWT-Only Authentication

​Internal Service Key Benefits

​Implementation

​Architecture

​Filter Implementation

​Security Configuration

​Authorization Manager

​Configuration

​Environment Variables

​Generating a Secure Key

​Use Cases

​1. Auth Service → User Service (Credentials Validation)

​2. Vehicle Service → User Service (Permission Check)

​3. Background Jobs

​Security Considerations

​Network Isolation

​Secret Management

​Key Rotation

​Rate Limiting

​Logging and Monitoring

​Comparison: Internal Key vs JWT

​Alternative: Mutual TLS (mTLS)

​Related Documentation

Overview

Why Internal Service Keys?

Problems with JWT-Only Authentication

Internal Service Key Benefits

Implementation

Architecture

Filter Implementation

Security Configuration

Authorization Manager

Configuration

Environment Variables

Generating a Secure Key

Use Cases

1. Auth Service → User Service (Credentials Validation)

2. Vehicle Service → User Service (Permission Check)

3. Background Jobs

Security Considerations

Network Isolation

Secret Management

Key Rotation

Rate Limiting

Logging and Monitoring

Comparison: Internal Key vs JWT

Alternative: Mutual TLS (mTLS)

Related Documentation